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Abstract
Deception is common in nature and humans are no exception1. Modern societies have created
institutions to control cheating, but many situations remain where only intrinsic honesty keeps
people from cheating and violating rules. Psychological2, sociological3 and economic theories4
suggest causal pathways about how the prevalence of rule violations in people's social
environment such as corruption, tax evasion, or political fraud can compromise individual intrinsic
honesty. Here, we present cross-societal experiments from 23 countries around the world, which
demonstrate a robust link between the prevalence of rule violations and intrinsic honesty. We
developed an index of the Prevalence of Rule Violations (PRV) based on country-level data of
corruption, tax evasion, and fraudulent politics. We measured intrinsic honesty in an anonymous
die-rolling experiment.5 We conducted the experiments at least eight years after the measurement
of PRV with 2568 young participants (students) who could not influence PRV. We find individual
intrinsic honesty is stronger in the subject pools of low PRV countries than those of high PRV
countries. The details of lying patterns support psychological theories of honesty.6,7 The results
are consistent with theories of the cultural co-evolution of institutions and values8 and show that
weak institutions and cultural legacies9-11 that generate rule violations not only have direct
adverse economic consequences but might also impair individual intrinsic honesty that is crucial
for the smooth functioning of society.
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Good institutions that limit cheating and rule violations, such as corruption, tax evasion and
political fraud are crucial for prosperity and development.12,13 Yet, even very strong
institutions cannot control all situations that may allow for cheating. Well functioning
societies also require citizens' intrinsic honesty. Cultural characteristics, such as whether
people see themselves as independent or part of a larger collective, that is, how individualist
or collectivist9 a society is, might also influence the prevalence of rule violations due to
differences in the perceived scope of moral responsibilities, which is larger in more
individualist cultures.10,14 Here, we investigate how the prevalence of rule violations in a
society and individual intrinsic honesty are linked. A variety of psychological, sociological
and economic theories suggest causal pathways of how widespread practices of violating
rules can affect individual honesty and the intrinsic willingness to follow rules.
Generally, processes of conformist transmission of values, beliefs, and experiences influence
individuals strongly and thereby can produce differences between social groups.15 The
extent to which people follow norms also depends on how prevalent norm violations are.3 If
cheating is pervasive in society and goes often unpunished, then people might view
dishonesty in certain everyday affairs as justifiable without jeopardising their self-concept of
being honest.2 Experiencing frequent unfairness, an inevitable by-product of cheating, can
also increase dishonesty16. Economic systems, institutions, and business cultures shape
people's ethical values8,17,18 and can likewise impact individual honesty.19,20
Ethical values, including honesty, are transmitted from prestigious people, peers, and
parents. People often take high-status individuals such as business leaders and celebrities as
role models21 and their cheating can set bad examples for dishonest practices.19 Similarly, if
politicians set bad examples by using fraudulent means like rigging elections, nepotism and
embezzlement, then the citizens’ honesty might suffer, because corruption is fostered in
wider parts of society.13 If many people work in the shadow economy and thereby evade
taxes, peer effects might make cheating more acceptable.22 If corruption is endemic in
society, parents may recommend a positive attitude towards corruption and other acts of
dishonesty and rule violations as a way to succeed in this environment.4,23
To measure the extent of society-wide practices of rule violations we construct an index of
the 'Prevalence of Rule Violations' (PRV). We focus on three broad types of rule violations:
political fraud, tax evasion, and corruption. We construct PRV by calculating the principal
component of three widely-used country-level variables that all rest on comprehensive, often
representative data sources to capture the important dimensions of the prevalence of rule
violations we are interested in: an indicator of political rights by Freedom House that
measures the democratic quality of a country’s political practices; the size of a country's
shadow economy as a proxy for tax evasion; and corruption as measured by the World
Bank's Control of Corruption index (Supplementary Methods).
We construct PRV for the 159 countries for which data are available for all three variables,
the earliest year being 2003. We use the 2003 data to maximise the distance between the
measurement of PRV and the point in time the experiments were run (at least 8 years later),
to ensure that our participants could not have influenced PRV. PRV in 2003 has a mean of 0
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(s.d. 1.46), and it ranges from −3.1 to 2.8 (higher values indicate higher prevalence of rule
violations).
Our strategy was to conduct comparable experiments in 23 diverse countries with a
distribution of PRV that resembles the world distribution of PRV: In the countries of our
sample, PRV in 2003 ranges from −3.1 to 2.0, with a mean of −0.7 (s.d. 1.52). Thus, the
distribution of PRV in our sample is approximately representative of the world distribution
of PRV with a slight bias towards lower PRV countries. The countries of our sample also
vary strongly according to frequently used cultural indicators such as individualism and
value orientations (Extended Data Table 1; Supplementary Methods).
Our participants, all nationals of the respective country, were young people with comparable
socio-demographic characteristics (students; mean age: 21.7 (s.d. 3.3) years; 48% females;
Supplementary Methods) who due to their youth had limited chances of being involved in
political fraud, tax evasion, and corruption, but might have been exposed to (or socialised
into) certain attitudes towards (dis-)respecting rules.24
Our experimental tool to measure intrinsic honesty was the ‘die-in-a-cup’ task5. Participants
sat in a cubicle and were asked to roll a six-sided die placed in an opaque cup twice, but to
report the first roll only. Die rolling was unobservable by anyone except the subject
(Extended Data Fig. 1). Participants were paid according to the number they reported:
reporting a 1 earned the participant 1 money unit (MU), claiming a 2 earned 2 MU, etc.,
except reporting a 6 earned nothing. Participants understood that reports were unverifiable.
Across countries, MU reflected local purchasing power (Supplementary Methods). Thus,
incentives in the experiment are the same for everyone, whether they live in a high or low
PRV environment.
While individual dishonesty is not detectable, aggregate behaviour is informative. In an
honest subject pool all numbers occur with probability 1/6 and the average claim is 2.5 MU.
We refer to this as the Full Honesty benchmark. By contrast, in the Full Dishonesty
benchmark, subjects follow their material incentives and claim 5 MU.
The die-in-a-cup task requires only a simple non-strategic decision, and it allows for gradual
dishonesty predicted by psychological theories of honesty.6,7 An experimentally-tested
theory of “justified ethicality”7 applied to our setting argues that many people have a desire
to maintain an honest self-image. Reporting a counterfactual die roll jeopardises this self-
image, but bending rules might not. Bending the rules is to report the higher of the two rolls,
rather than the first roll as required. Reporting the better of two rolls implies the Justified
Dishonesty benchmark: claims of 0 should occur in 1/36 ≈ 2.8% of the cases (after rolling
6-6); claims of 1 should occur in 3/36 ≈ 8.3% (after 6-1, or 1-6, or 1-1); claims of 2, 3, 4 and
5 should occur in 13.9%, 19.4%, 25%, and 30.6% of cases, respectively.
Fig. 1 illustrates the benchmarks, presented as cumulative distribution functions (CDFs).
Fig. 1 also shows the empirical CDF for each subject pool. CDFs are far away from Full
Dishonesty. CDFs are also bent away from Full Honesty and cluster around the Justified
Dishonesty benchmark. One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for discrete data reject the
null hypotheses of equality of CDFs with the Full Honesty benchmarks for every subject
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pool, but cannot reject the null hypothesis in 13 subject pools in comparisons with the
Justified Dishonesty benchmark (Extended Data Fig. 2a).
Deviations from the Justified Dishonesty benchmark are related to PRV. The CDFs of
subject pools from low PRV countries tend to be above the CDF implied by Justified
Dishonesty, and also above those of most high PRV countries. Comparing the distributions
of claims pooled for all low and high PRV countries, respectively, reveals a highly
significant difference (nlow = 1211, nhigh = 1357; χ2(5) = 40.21, P < 0.001). The pooled CDF
from high PRV countries first-order stochastically dominates the pooled CDF from low
PRV countries, that is, subjects from low PRV countries are more honest than subjects from
high PRV countries. The pooled CDF from low PRV countries also lies significantly above
Justified Dishonesty (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, d = 0.103, P < 0.001), whereas the pooled
CDF from high PRV countries tends to be slightly below it (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, d =
0.058, P < 0.001; Extended Data Fig. 2b; Supplementary Analyses).
The inset figure illustrates the implications of these patterns in terms of average claims.
Subjects from low PRV countries claim 3.17 MUs (s.d. 1.67), that is, 0.67 MU more than
under Full Honesty. Subjects from high PRV countries claim 3.53 MU (s.d. 1.49) or 1.03
MU more than under Full Honesty. This difference in claims is significant (t-test, t = 5.84,
two-sided P < 0.001); it also holds at the country level (n = 23; Mann-Whitney test, z = 3.40,
two-sided P < 0.001). Justified Dishonesty implies an expected claim of 3.47 MU. The
average claim in high PRV countries is not significantly different from this benchmark (one-
sample t-test, nhigh = 1357, t = 1.48, two-sided P = 0.140), but is significantly lower in low
PRV countries (one-sample t-test, nlow = 1211, t = 6.35, two-sided P < 0.001).
Next we look at four measures of dishonesty one can derive from our task (Supplementary
Information) and relate them to country-level PRV (Fig. 2). A first measure of dishonesty is
Mean Claim, which ranges from 2.96 MU to 3.96 MU across countries (mean 3.32 MU, s.d.
0.26; Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2(22) = 75.2, P < 0.001). PRV and Mean Claim are strongly
positively related (Fig. 2a).
A second measure is the frequency of High Claims 3, 4 and 5, which should occur at 50% if
people are honest and at 75% under Justified Dishonesty. Frequencies range from 61.0% to
84.3% (mean 71.8%, s.d. 5.7%; χ2(22) = 45.0, P = 0.003). PRV and High Claims are
strongly positively associated (Fig. 2b).
Incentives are to claim 5, irrespective of the number actually rolled. Thus, the fraction of
Income Maximisers provides our third measure of dishonesty. It is estimated from the
fraction of people who reported 5 (Highest Claim) minus the expected rate of actual rolls of
5 (16.7%). To account for income maximisers who actually rolled a 5 the difference has to
be multiplied by 6/5.5 The rate of income maximisers ranges from 0.3% to 38.3% across
subject pools (mean 16.2%, s.d. 9.4%; χ2(22) = 72.4, P < 0.001). Given that PRV captures
rule violations for selfish gains and evidence suggesting rule breakers tend to be more
selfish25 we predict that Income Maximisers is positively correlated with PRV. We find,
however, that they are unrelated (Fig. 2c). Thus, a society’s PRV does not systematically
affect maximal cheating in this experiment.
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This result is in stark contrast to the observation that the estimated fraction of Fully Honest
People and PRV are significantly negatively related (Fig. 2d). The fraction of Fully Honest
People, our fourth measure, is estimated from No Claim, that is, reports of 6. A report of 6 is
most likely honest and honest reports can occur for all numbers. Therefore, the fraction of
Fully Honest People can be estimated as the fraction of people reporting 6 multiplied by six.
Across subject pools, Fully Honest People ranges from 4.3% to 87% (mean 48.9%, s.d.
21.3%; χ2(22) = 42.1, P = 0.006). In societies with high levels of PRV, fewer people are
fully honest than in societies with low levels of PRV.
Regression analyses that control for individual attitudes to honesty and beliefs in the fairness
of others, as well as for socio-demographics confirm the robustness of our results (Extended
Data Table 2; Supplementary Analysis). Socio-demographic variables, including gender, are
generally insignificant. Stronger individual norms of honesty significantly reduce Mean
Claim, High Claim and Highest Claim. Beliefs in the fairness of others only significantly
reduce Highest Claim.
Results are also robust using the earliest available data related to PRV, corruption in 1996;
using Government Effectiveness, a proxy for bureaucratic quality and material security11
and measures of institutional quality that emphasise law enforcement (rules) and not actual
compliance and that also extend far into the past, so they are most likely not influenced even
by parents (Extended Data Fig. 3a-d; Supplementary Analysis).
Given that the experiment holds the rules and incentives constant for everyone, the large
differences across subject pools are also consistent with a cultural transmission of norms of
honesty and rule following through the generations4,15,23 and a co-evolution of norms and
institutions8. Societies with higher material security, as measured by Government
Effectiveness, tend to be more individualist11 and more individualist societies tend to have
less corruption10. Consistent with this, we find that subject pools from individualist societies
have lower claims than subject pools from more collectivist societies and also from more
traditional societies and societies with survival-related values (Extended Data Fig. 4a-c;
Supplementary Analysis). Further econometric analyses developed in economic literature on
culture and institutions14 applied to PRV support the argument that both the quality of
institutions as well as culture (individualism) are highly significantly (and likely causally)
correlated with PRV (Extended Data Table 3; Supplementary Analysis).
Taken together, our results suggest that institutions and cultural values influence PRV,
which, through various theoretically predicted and experimentally tested
pathways2,11,16,19,20,22-26, impact on people’s intrinsic honesty and rule following. Our
experiments from around the globe provide also novel support for arguments that for many
people lying is psychologically costly.27-30 More specifically, theories of honesty posit that
many people are either honest, or (self-deceptively1) bend rules or lie gradually to an extent
that is compatible with maintaining an honest self-image6,7. Evidence for lying aversion and
honest self-concepts has been mostly confined to western societies with low PRV values.30
Our expanded scope of societies therefore provides important support and qualifications for
the generalizability of these theories: people benchmark their justifiable dishonesty with the
extent of dishonesty they see in their societal environment.
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Extended Data
Extended Data Figure 1. The die-in-a-cup task (due to Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi5)
Participants (n = 2568 from 23 countries) are asked to roll the die twice in the cup and to
report the first roll. Payment is according to reported roll, except reporting 6 earns 0 money
units (MU; across subject pools MU in local currency are adjusted to equalise purchasing
power). We used the same set of dice in all subject pools, and we also tested the dice for
biasedness. The procedures followed established rules in cross-cultural experimental
economics. See Supplementary Information for further details. This picture was taken by
J.S. in the experimental laboratory of the University of Nottingham.
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Extended Data Figure 2. Distribution of claims
a. Distribution per subject pool. Subject pools are ordered by country PRV. The first 14
subject pools (in green) are from “low” (below-average) PRV countries; the last 9 subject
pools (in red) are from “high” (above-average) PRV countries relative to the world sample
of 159 countries. The horizontal black line refers to the uniform distribution implied by
honest reporting and the blue step function to the distribution implied by the Justified
Dishonesty benchmark (JDB). For each subject pool we report the one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (KS) for discrete data in comparison with JDB (KSD is the KS d value). Stars
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above bars refer to binomial tests comparing the frequency of a particular claim with its
predicted value under a uniform distribution. b. Cumulative distributions for pooled data
from subject pools from low and high PRV countries, respectively. See Supplementary
Analysis for further information. * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.
Extended Data Figure 3. Association between indicators of institutional quality and intrinsic
honesty as measured by Mean Claim
The blue line is a linear fit. The line marked ‘JDB’ indicates the ‘Justified Dishonesty
benchmark’. rho indicates Spearman rank order correlation coefficients. Mean Claim is
negatively related to a. Government Effectiveness; b. Constraint on Executive; c. ‘Fairness
of Electoral Process and Participation’; d. Constraint on Executive using the averages of the
years 1890 to 1900 as a measure for distant institutional quality. See Extended Data Table 1
and Supplementary Information for data description, references, and further analyses.
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Extended Data Figure 4. Association between cultural indicators and intrinsic honesty as
measured by Mean Claim
The blue line is a linear fit. The line marked ‘JDB’ indicates the ‘Justified Dishonesty
benchmark’. rho indicates Spearman rank order correlation coefficients. Mean Claim is
negatively related to a. Individualism; b. Traditional vs. secular-rational values; c. Survival
vs. self-expression values. See Extended Data Table 1 and Supplementary Information for
data description, references, and further analyses.
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Extended Data Table 2
Regression analysis of societal and individual determinants of dishonesty 
The explanatory variables are the scores of a country's Prevalence of Rule Violations in
2003; participants' individual norms of honesty (based on individual opinions about
justifiableness of various acts of cheating; higher scores indicate stronger norms);
participants' beliefs in fairness (the perceived fairness of most others; a higher score
indicates a higher belief). Socio-demographic controls include age; dummies for sex, urban
residency, middle class status, being an economics student, and being religious; and the
percentage of other participants known to a participant. Detailed data description and
rationale are in the Supplementary Methods. Chi2-tests reveal that socio-demographic
controls are jointly insignificant in all models except model (2), where they are weakly
significant. The estimation method is OLS with bootstrapped standard errors clustered on
countries. The results are robust to various specifications (Supplementary Analysis).
(1) Claim (2) High Claim
(Numbers 3, 4, 5)
(3) Highest Claim
(Number 5)
(4) No Claim
(Number 6)
PRV in 2003 0.115*** (0.033) 0.030*** (0.007) 0.012 (0.010) −0.016*** (0.005)
Individual norms of
honesty
−0.055*** (0.018) −0.012*** (0.004) −0.014** (0.006) 0.002 (0.002)
Individual beliefs in
fairness of others
−0.075 (0.085) −0.012 (0.030) −0.050** (0.021) −0.004 (0.009)
Age −0.005 (0.011) −0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.001)
Female −0.108* (0.058) −0.020 (0.016) −0.019 (0.020) 0.014 (0.012)
Middleclass −0.064 (0.106) −0.021 (0.033) −0.001 (0.022) 0.002 (0.018)
Urban −0.052 (0.055) −0.027 (0.016) −0.013 (0.014) −0.006 (0.013)
Economic Student 0.122 (0.099) 0.042 (0.028) −0.009 (0.032) −0.023 (0.016)
Religious −0.061 (0.090) −0.030 (0.022) 0.023 (0.023) 0.018 (0.014)
% known in session 0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Constant 4.080*** (0.315) 0.925*** (0.073) 0.376*** (0.112) −0.006 (0.044)
Test for joint
significance of Socio-
demographic controls
Chi2(7)=9.18 Chi2(7)=12.37* Chi2(7)=6.42 Chi2(7)=11.88
N 2284 2284 2284 2284
R2 0.022 0.018 0.014 0.010
*
P < 0.10,
**
P < 0.05,
***
P < 0.01.
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Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. Distributions of reported die rolls
Depicted are the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of amounts claimed compared to
the CDFs of the Full Honesty, Justified Dishonesty and Full Dishonesty benchmarks. Green
coloured CDFs represent subject pools (nlow = 14) from countries with a below-average
Prevalence of Rule Violations (PRV; mean PRVlow = −1.69), and red coloured CDFs
represent subject pools (nhigh = 9) from countries with above-average PRV (mean PRVhigh =
0.78) out of 159 countries. Inset, the average claim is shown for subjects from below
average (‘low’, nlow = 1211) and above average (‘high’, nhigh = 1211) PRV countries. *** P
< 0.01, two-sided t-tests; n.s. P > 0.14. JDB is the Justified Dishonesty benchmark.
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Figure 2. Measures of honesty and the prevalence of rule violations in society
Shown are scatter plots of four measures of honesty and PRV at country level (n = 23);
higher values indicate more rule violations. a, Mean Claim. b, Percent High Claims of 3, 4,
and 5 MU. c, Percent Income Maximisers estimated from the fraction of people claiming 5
MU. d, Percent Fully Honest People estimated from the fraction of people claiming 0 MU.
rho is the Spearman rank correlation based on country means. JDB is the Justified
Dishonesty benchmark (not defined for c and d). Colour coding refers to the Quality of
Institutions as measured by Constraints on Executives; shapes distinguish between countries
classified as collectivist or individualist. PRV is negatively correlated with Constraints on
Executives and Individualism (Supplementary Information); this also holds in our sample
(Constraint on Executive: rho = −0.76, n = 23, P < 0.0001; Individualism: rho= −0.79, n =
22, P < 0.0001).
Gächter and Schulz Page 18
Nature. Author manuscript.
 Europe PM
C
 Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
 Europe PM
C
 Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
 1 
0BSupporting Information for 
 
Intrinsic Honesty and the Prevalence of  
Rule Violations across Societies 
 
Simon Gächter1,2,3,* and Jonathan F. Schulz1,4 
Affiliations: 
1 University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. 
2 CESifo, Munich, Germany 
3 IZA, Bonn, Germany 
4 Yale University, New Haven, CT 06510, USA 
 
 
18 January 2016 
Correspondence: Simon Gächter, email: simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk;  
Jonathan Schulz, email: jonathan.schulz@yale.edu 
Contents 
 
1. Supplementary Methods  
1.1  Indicator of the prevalence of rule violations (and other institutional and cultural 
indicators) 
1.2 Experimental design and procedures 
1.3  Further methodological details of the cross-cultural implementation 
1.4  Subject pool details 
2. Supplementary Analysis 
2.1 Supplementary analysis to Fig. 1 and Extended Data Fig. 2 
2.2 Supplementary regression analyses to Extended Data Table 2  
 (Societal and individual determinants of dishonesty) 
2.3 Robustness checks: association between intrinsic honesty and PRV, institutional 
quality, and cultural indicators 
2.4 Supplementary regression analyses to Extended Data Table 3 
 (Institutional and Cultural Determinants of PRV) 
2.5 Testing for potential spillovers from preceding experiment 
3. References 
4. Human Subjects Approval 
5. Acknowledgements  
 2 
1. Supplementary Materials 
 
1.1 Indicator of the prevalence of rule violations (and other institutional 
and cultural indicators) 
 
We selected the countries of our subject pools to span a wide range according to 
relevant societal background indicators. Our approach avoids the problem of drawing 
inferences about human behaviour from only a small set of "WEIRD" societies1 and 
allows learning about societal differences that smaller data sets from less varied societies 
would not permit. In particular, we aimed at societies that differ strongly (and hence give 
us strong power) with regard to our main variables of interest - corruption, the shadow 
economy, and the honesty of the political system in a country. Extended Data Table 1 
summarises for the countries of our subject pools the detailed scores of the societal 
indicator data we use in this paper. Here, we provide the details about these indicators. 
 
Index of the Prevalence of Rule Violations  
Our aim is to construct one measure - the Index of the Prevalence of Rule Violations 
(PRV) - that captures several dimensions of the prevalence of rule violations at the 
societal level: corruption, tax evasion, and political fraud. The three underlying indicators 
we use and explain in detail below are (i) the Political Rights indicator by Freedom 
House as a proxy for the honesty of the political system, (ii) estimates by Buehn and 
Schneider for the shadow economy as a proxy for tax evasion and (iii) the World Banks’ 
governance indicator ‘control of corruption’.  
For calculating PRV we use data from 2003, the earliest year where data on all three 
sources from which PRV is derived are available. We conducted the experiments 
between October 2011 and September 2015 with subjects who at the time of the 
experiments were on average 21.7 years old. That means that in 2003 they were between 
11 and 14 years old and thus most likely had no influence on the PRV of their country.  
We now describe these indicators and then how we constructed the PRV.  
 
Control of Corruption. The World Bank Governance indicator ‘Control of Corruption’ 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/wgidataset.xlsx, accessed 28.10.2015) is our 
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measure of corruption. It captures “perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
'capture' of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, et al.2, p. 223). Thus, 
corruption is a form of cheating, of bending the rules for one's own purposes. 'Control of 
corruption' is a widely used aggregate indicator that is based on 15 representative and 
non-representative sources. Since corruption itself is hardly measurable the focus is on 
perception of corruption by public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well 
citizens and company survey respondents. The variable ‘Control of Corruption’ is 
standardised and it ranges from -1.8 to 2.5. The country scores in our sample range from  
-1.0 to 2.2, where higher values indicate better control of corruption (i.e., less corruption). 
The world average is 0.0, and our country sample mean is 0.4.    
 
The Shadow Economy. The shadow economy concerns the market-based production of 
legal goods and services with a deliberate goal to conceal this activity to avoid income, 
value added or other taxes, social security contributions, or to avoid compliance with 
regulations and administrative procedures. It is a significant problem for many 
economies3-5 and an important example for dishonest practices. Our data for the size of 
the shadow economy are from Buehn and Schneider5, Table 3. Their estimates are based 
on monetary indicators (cash holdings), labour market indicators (labour market 
participation rate and growth rates) and the state of the official economy (GDP per capita 
and growth rates). The size of the shadow economy is measured in percent of the size of 
the GDP. In 2003 the average country in our sample had a shadow economy of 28% 
(fairly close to the world average of 33%); the range is from 10% to 66%.  
 
Political Rights. To capture the honesty of political processes, we use the ‘Political 
Rights’ scores by Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
aggregate-and-subcategory-scores, file ‘Aggregate Scores’, accessed 28.10.2015). The 
scores are based on expert judgments guided by a series of checklist questions grouped in 
three sub-categories. (A) Electoral process focuses on free and fair elections of the 
executive and legislative as well as a fair electoral framework. For example, underlying 
checklist questions ask whether the vote count is transparent and honestly reported, or 
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whether the registration of voters and candidates is conducted in an accurate, timely, 
transparent and non-discriminatory manner. (B) Political Pluralism and Participation is 
based on questions on the discrimination of (oppositional) political parties, the extent to 
which political choices are free from domination by powerful groups (e.g. by bribing, 
intimidation, harassment or attacks), and questions on minority voting rights; 
(C) Functioning of Government focuses on corruption, transparency, and the ability of 
elected officials to govern in practice. For example, checklist question ask whether 
allegations of corruption by government officials are thoroughly investigated and 
prosecuted, or whether the budget-making process is subject to meaningful legislative 
review and public scrutiny. The scores vary between -2 and 44 with higher scores 
referring to a higher level of political rights. Our sample mean is 28, somewhat higher 
than the world average of 24. The countries in our sample cover almost the whole range 
of values from 2 to 40.  
 
Index of Prevalence of Rule Violations (PRV). Consistent with expectations, the three 
variables (Control of Corruption (CC), Shadow Economy (SE) and Political Rights (PR)), 
which measure different but related aspects of the prevalence of rule violations, are 
substantially and highly significantly (P < 0.0001) correlated (CC & SE: -0.7; CC & PR: 
0.67; SE & PR: -0.4). This suggests there is an underlying component (which we call 
"prevalence of rule violations") that drives these correlations. We apply a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) to uncover this component (or the components). The purpose 
of the PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of a data set with correlated variables down to 
a number of variables (the principal components) that explain a significant fraction of the 
variation in the underlying data set and thereby succinctly summarize the data6. The fact 
that the three variables are sufficiently strongly, but less than perfectly, correlated makes 
a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) meaningful.  
To perform the PCA and to construct our PRV we use country averages for the year 
2003 of 159 countries for which we have data for all three indicators. The year 2003 is 
the first year where data is available for all three indicators. Our initial PCA with three 
components shows a clear distinction between the first component (eigenvalue of 2.13 – 
explaining 71% percent of the variance) and the second (eigenvalue of 0.67) and third 
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component (eigenvalue of 0.2) explaining 22% and 7% respectively. This result 
demonstrates that the three indicators share one component that explains a very large 
fraction of the variance. Based on this finding (and following the Kaiser criterion which 
suggests dropping components with eigenvalues below 1) we only retained the first 
component. For this component we calculated composite scores for each country, which 
constitute our PRV. For the sample of 159 countries PRV has a mean of about zero, a 
standard deviation of 1.46. PRV ranges from -3.1 to 2.8. Higher values indicate a higher 
prevalence of rule violations. For the countries in our sample, the mean is -0.7 and the 
range is from -3.1 to 2. The overlap in the range of PRV is considerable (from -3.1 to 2). 
Only 7 countries (4%) out of 159 have a PRV higher than ‘2’ (the largest value in our 
sample). Thus, our sample is approximately representative of the world distribution. 
 
Institutional Indicators 
As indicators of the quality of institutions, we use two frequently used measures, 
Constraint on the Executive, Fairness of Electoral Process and Participation (which is a 
sub-indicator of Constraint on the Executive. and Government Effectiveness.  
 
Constraint on the Executive. Our proxy for political institutions is Constraint on the 
Executive from the Polity IV data set (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html, 
accessed 13.06.2015). It measures the institutionalized limitations on the arbitrary use of 
power by the executive. Any “accountability groups” may impose such limitations to 
varying degrees. This can be legislatures; the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of 
nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in 
many states a strong, independent judiciary. ‘Constraint on Executive’ is closely related 
to protection from government expropriation: More constraints implies that the executive 
cannot simply expropriate, but is accountable to legislatures and other groups as well as 
the judiciary. ‘Constraint on Executive’ is a widely-used measure for the quality of 
institutions7,8.  
Conceptually this measure has the feature that it relies on expert opinions on 
(mostly) observable features of a well-defined set of political institutions. As Acemoglu 
and Johnson7 argue it corresponds to the procedural rules constraining state actions. Thus, 
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in contrast to subjective performance measures of institutions, this measure captures 
variation in institutions without being strongly associated with variation in law 
compliance of ordinary citizens. ‘Constraint on Executive’ is measured on a scale ranging 
from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (accountable executive, constrained by checks and 
balances). Thus, higher values correspond to better institutions. For our contemporary 
measure we used country averages of the years 1990 to 2000. The world sample varies 
from 1 to 7 with a mean of 4.5 while the countries in our sample exhibit a mean of 5.5 
and vary from 2.8 to 7. The Spearman correlation between ‘Constraint on Executive 
(1990 to 2000)’ and PRV is -0.67 (P < 0.0001, n = 150). This is also the case when we 
use a historic measure ‘Constraint on Executive (1890 to 1900)’. The Spearman 
correlation is -0.60 (P < 0.0001, n = 50). 
 
Fairness of Electoral Process and Participation. For this variable we excluded the sub-
category ‘Functioning of Government’ from the ‘Political Rights’ indicator (the data are 
taken from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-
scores, file ‘Subcategory Scores’, accessed 28.10.2012). This leaves only the sub-
categories ‘Electoral Process’ and ‘Political Participation and Pluralism’. The rationale 
for constructing this measure is that compared to ‘Political Rights’ it captures to a larger 
degree variations in law enforcement without being as strongly associated with variation 
in law compliance of ordinary citizens. That is, it is more likely to measure the 
functioning of the law and less likely to be affected by the dishonesty of the generation of 
the parents of our participants. The correlation with PRV is -0.73 (P < 0.001). 
 
Government Effectiveness. This is an indicator developed by the World Bank. It 
captures perceptions of the quality of public and civil service, the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/wgidataset.xlsx, accessed 28.10.2015). Aside 
from the quality of bureaucracy the measure reflects satisfaction with infrastructure, 
education, drinking water, sanitation and basic health services. As such, it can be used as 
a proxy for material security9. It is also correlated with behaviour in a die-rolling 
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experiment related to ours.10 We use the scores for the year 2000. The Government 
Effectiveness indicator is a standardised variable with world mean of approx. 0, standard 
deviation of approx. 1 and an empirical range of -2.3 to 2.2. The average for the countries 
of our sample is 0.5, ranging from -0.7 to 2.1. The Spearman correlation with PRV is  
-0.89 (P < 0.001; n = 159) and with GDP per capita 0.78 (P < 0.001; n = 180). 
 
Cultural Indicators 
As indicators of cultural differences between our subject pools we use two frequently 
used measures, Individualism/Collectivism and Value Orientations.  
 
Individualism/Collectivism. Our measure for Individualism/Collectivism is due to 
Hofstede11 (retrieved from http://geert-hofstede.com/, accessed 28.10.2015 - the results 
are qualitatively very similar when using the smaller subset published in Hofstede et 
al.12). ‘Individualism’ measures how important the individual is relative to the collective 
in a society. Collectivist societies are tightly knit and individuals act predominantly as 
loyal members of a lifelong and cohesive group or organization; individualist societies 
are more loosely knit and group boundaries are more permeable.  
Individualism-collectivism is an important cultural distinction.13 Our interest stems 
from the idea that in collectivist societies morality tends to be limited to the in-group.14-16 
Rule violations favouring the in-group may therefore be more frequent and sanctioned 
less by informal institutions in collectivist societies. Further, the strong reliance on the 
family or the clan may prevent the development of functioning formal institutions. Thus, 
the hypothesis is that individualist societies have a lower prevalence of rule violations. 
Existing research suggests that more collectivist societies tend to be more corrupt17, have 
weaker formal institutions8,18, less innovation and weaker growth.19,20 Furthermore, 
research suggests that there is no robust effect on economic growth from cultural 
dimensions that are independent from the individualism–collectivism cultural trait.21 
In the world sample the range is from 6 to 91 (average is 39), where higher values 
indicate more individualist societies. Our sample average is 46, and our range is from 6 to 
89. Consistent with our hypothesis, the Spearman correlation with PRV is -0.65  
(P < 0.0001, n = 99). That is, more collectivist societies tend to have higher PRV. 
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Value orientations. These indicators are due to Inglehart and co-workers22-24, who argue 
that societies can be characterized by two dimensions: ‘traditional vs. secular-rational 
values’ and ‘survival vs. self-expression values’. The data on value orientations are 
taken from Inglehart and Welzel25. 
‘Traditional vs. secular-rational values’ refers to people’s attitudes on topics like 
abortion, national pride, obedience, and respect for authorities. ‘Survival vs. self-
expression values’ refers to attitudes on the importance of economic and physical security 
over self-expression and quality-of-life; homosexuality, happiness and trust.  
Our sample averages on value orientations are very similar to the world averages and 
they also cover a wide range compared to the world sample. Both indicators, ‘Traditional 
vs. secular-rational values’ (Spearman's rho=-0.50, P < 0.0001, n = 86) and ‘Survival vs. 
self-expression values’ (rho=-0.70, P < 0.0001, n = 86) are highly correlated with PRV. 
Survival values are interesting because they might be linked to material security, 
which can have an impact on quality of institutions, in particular Government 
Effectiveness as a proxy for material security.10 We find that survival values are 
correlated with Government Effectiveness (rho = 0.71; P = 0.0000, n = 92).  
Traditional values are also interesting because they are correlated with beliefs in 
heaven and hell (which have been found to correlate with national crime levels26): Beliefs 
in heaven and hell (data taken from26) are correlated with Traditional values (beliefs in 
heaven, rho = -0.82, P = 0.0000, n = 63; beliefs in hell: rho = -0.73, P  = 0.0000, n = 73).   
 
Economic Indicator 
GDP per Capita. On obvious economic variable to characterise societies is the GDP per 
capita. Due to its long history and importance in country comparisons it is likely a 
comparable objective measure of economic prosperity. The data are taken from the 
World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund (retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx). Between 1990 
and 2000 the mean GDP per capita (in $1000, PPP) in the countries of our sample is 9.9 
compared to 7.8 in the world sample. The range in our sample is from 0.7 to 23.7. The 
Spearman correlation of the GDP with PRV is -0.76 (P < 0.0001, n = 159). 
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1.2 Experimental design and procedures 
 
The task we use is a "die-in-a-cup task" due to Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi27 
which we implement in a very similar way as them. It has several features, which makes 
it an ideal task for our purpose. It can be conducted quickly, is very easy to understand 
for participants, allows for gradual dishonesty and is a non-strategic setting. That is, 
payoffs do not depend on the action of other participants. As lying can never by verified 
at the individual level, it gives a benchmark for dishonesty when reputational concerns 
are absent and subjects are aware of this.  
Because the task is very short (it lasts about 5 minutes), it was, as in27, added at the 
end of an experimental session featuring unrelated experiments (we will discuss them in 
section 2.5 and show that spillover effects are unlikely). The following texts and three 
screen shots document how we explained the task to the subjects. Extended Data Figure 1 
illustrates the typical laboratory setup in which decisions occurred.  
 
Script and Screenshots of Instructions  
Script: A local experimenter (always a native speaker) read the following text (translated 
into the local language):  
“Before we start with the pay-out we ask you to answer a short questionnaire. All 
answers are treated as strictly confidential. For the following questionnaires you will 
receive an additional payment. However, this payment is not the same for every 
participant. You determine your own payment by throwing a die twice. You will find 
the instructions on the computer screen. As soon as you have read and understood 
the instructions, please press OK. Do not roll the die before you have read the 
instructions and you are told on the computer screen to roll the die. Let me repeat: 
do not throw the die until you are told on the computer screen.” 
Subsequently the six-sided dice are distributed in non-transparent plastic cups and the z-
Tree treatment is started. 
 
Instructions/Screenshots for the die-in-a-cup task 
Instructions were only delivered on screen. Screenshots I-III show the interface 
subjects saw (the screenshots are from the English version). These texts were translated 
into the respective local language and payoffs were adapted to reflect local purchasing 
power. More details on the cross-societal implementation are described in section 1.3. 
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Screenshot I: Introducing the task 
 
Screenshot II: Prompting subjects to throw the die 
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Screenshot III: Prompting subjects to report their number and resulting claim 
 
 
Testing the quality of the dice 
To ensure that the dice used in a particular subject pool do not bias the results of die 
rolling, we used the same set of dice in all subject pools. In total, we used a set of 71 dice, 
from which we randomly sampled the actual number needed in a particular session.  
To test the quality of dice we randomly sampled 35 dice (≈50% of dice) and tested 
them by rolling each of them in a cup for 120 times. We ran Chi2(5) tests to see whether 
the distribution of Chi2(5)-values is within the theoretically expected range, which we 
determined by simulated die rolls, using a computerised random number generator. For a 
fair unbiased die, all numbers are equally likely. Random variation does exist, but at 
α=0.05 Chi2(5)-values should be below 11.07 with a probability of 95%. That is, in our 
sample of 35 dice we expect about 1.75 Chi2(5)-values exceeding 11.07. We observed 
three Chi2(5)>11.07, which is not significantly different from the expected value 
(binomial test, P = 0.2542). The empirical distribution of the 35 Chi2(5)-values is also not 
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significantly different from the simulated distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,  
P = 0.3940). We conclude that the dice we used are unbiased.  
 
Rationale and indicators of (dis)honesty derived from the task 
Because participants roll the die in private the reported numbers are never verifiable 
and subjects are aware of this. Reputational incentives are minimised. Thus, participants 
who did not roll a 5 have a financial incentive to report a higher number than they 
actually rolled (the material incentives are to report a 5) and no one will ever find out. In 
that sense the experiment taps into people's pure intrinsic preferences for honesty that are 
not confounded with considerations of weighing costs and benefits of dishonesty because 
the experiment sets the material and reputational costs essentially to zero. 
While individual dishonesty is not detectable, aggregate behaviour is informative 
about dishonesty. If all people are honest and report the number they actually rolled, all 
six numbers should be equally distributed with frequency 1/6 ≈ 16.7%. Expressed in 
terms of money units (MU), the expected claim therefore is 2.5 MU. If people are 
maximally dishonest, they would all report '5'.  
Given previous results on this task, in particular by Fischbacher and Heusi-Föllmi27 
whose design and procedures we have adopted, and previous literature using the same28-30 
or related10,31-36, but also different tasks37-41), we expect the results to be between these 
two extreme outcomes41. An important benchmark, discussed in detail in the main text, is 
Justified Dishonesty28, according to which people will not report a number they actually 
did not roll, but they might bend the rules and report the better of the two rolls, rather 
than the first one, as the rules stipulate. 
In addition to comparing reporting patterns to the Justified Dishonesty benchmark, 
our simple experiment allows us to look at four measures of honesty: the actual average 
claim; the fraction of high numbers (3, 4, 5); the estimated fraction of income 
maximizing (dishonest) people; and the estimated fraction of fully honest people:  
1. The actual average claim (‘Mean Claim’) can be interpreted as the severity of 
dishonesty in a subject pool. In an honest subject pool mean claims are 2.5 MU, 
while in a fully dishonest subject pool claims are 5 MU.  The average claim 
implied by the Justified Dishonesty benchmark is 3.47 MU.  
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2. The fraction of high claims (‘High Claims’, 3, 4, and 5). If subjects are honest, 
50% of all reports should be 3, 4 or 5. However, subjects who roll a lower-paying 
number (6, 1, and 2) may have an incentive to lie and report a higher number. 
While income maximising people will report a 5 some people may shy away from 
exaggerating too much and increase their claims by reporting a 3 or a 4. 
Compared to the actual average claim it captures therefore to a greater extent the 
frequency of lies (and not severity) in a subject pool. The expected frequency of 
High Claims is 75% under the Justified Dishonesty benchmark.  
3. The fraction of income maximising people (‘Income Maximisers’) can be 
estimated from the number of people who report a '5' assuming that all people 
who actually rolled a '5' report a 5 (expected to occur in 16.7% of cases). The 
fraction of income maximisers can therefore be calculated from the fraction s of 
reported 5's: (s - 0.167)*(6/5). If only those who actually rolled a '5' report a 5, s = 
0.167, the fraction of income maximising people is 0; if all people who did not 
roll a '5' (expected to occur for 83.3% of people) nevertheless report a 5, the 
fraction of income maximising people is estimated to be (1 – 0.167)*1.2 = 1. The 
multiplication of (6/5)=1.2 is necessary to account for income maximising people 
who actually rolled a 5 (see also Fischbacher and Heusi-Föllmi27, footnote 5). The 
measure of income maximisers contains homo economicus types who will always 
report the number 5 irrespective of the number they actually rolled. However, it 
may also contain limited dishonest people (e.g., a person who reports the number 
5 in case he rolled a 4, but reports 4 if he rolled a 3). Thus, the measure of income 
maximisers is an upper-bound estimate for homo economicus types. Under 
Justified Dishonesty, nobody is an income-maximiser (in the sense of always 
claiming 5), so this benchmark is not properly defined. With regard to the 
expected number of claims of 5 under justified dishonesty we expect claims of 5 
whenever a 5 showed up in any of the two rolls, which is expected to happen in 
11/36 ≈ 30.6% of cases. 
4. The fraction of unconditionally honest people (‘Fully Honest People’) can be 
estimated from the fraction h of people who report a '6', which earns nothing (‘No 
Claim’). People who are willing to report the truth even if it earns nothing are 
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arguably at least as likely to tell the truth if it earns something. Hence, we can 
assume that unconditionally honest people report any number they actually roll 
and honest reports can therefore occur across all die numbers. We can therefore 
use the fraction h of reports of 6 to estimate the fraction of fully honest people 
across all die rolls: h*6. We speak of ‘fully honest people’ to emphasise that 
people who did not truthfully report a claim of 0, would have truthfully reported a 
claim of 1 or higher. In this sense it is a lower bound for honesty. However, it 
would be an upper bound estimate for ‘fully honesty people’ if some people 
reported a 6 and therefore claim 0 despite having rolled another number. Since the 
measure is based on a single claim (the one that earns nothing) this is a more 
noisy measure than ‘High claims’ and ‘Mean Claim’. Under Justified Dishonesty 
nobody is unconditionally honest. Thus, strictly speaking, Justified Dishonesty is 
not defined, but we expect to see No Claim only if subjects roll 6-6, which is 
expected to happen in 1/36 ≈ 2.8% of cases. 
 
Procedures 
We conducted all experiments in computer laboratories at the respective universities 
or institutions (see Section 1.4, Table S1). All participants gave informed consent. We 
took great care that the participants made their decision in private. In all laboratories we 
set up partitions that ensured maximal anonymity. Additionally, we distributed the die in 
a cup. This ensures that only participants and no one else can find out the actual number 
rolled. Distributing the die in a cup is also very natural. During the experiment all 
experimenters stayed at the experimenter computer (invisible to the participants since 
they were sitting behind their partitions). Extended Data Figure 1 illustrates the typical 
setup as seen by the participants. 
We used the experimental software z-Tree42 to conduct our experiment. Z-tree was 
adapted so that messages on-screen appeared in the local language (the z-Tree codes we 
used are available upon request). Subjects typed in their reported number and the 
respective earnings in a computer interface (see screenshot III). Subjects could only 
continue when the entries matched. This ensured that participants understood the 
financial consequences of their report.  
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We conducted the experiments between October 2011 and September 2015 
according to established methods of cross-cultural experimental economics (see 
Section 1.3 for the details). We aimed at recruiting participants according to standardised 
procedures subject to constraints at local universities. We did not ask potential 
participants about their nationality during recruitment to not introduce experimenter 
effects. For this reason we did not only recruit nationals of the respective country. Out of 
the 2790 participants we had to drop 222 observations for which the nationality did not 
coincide with the country the experiment was conducted. (We kept data from one session 
in China, where we do not have questionnaire data about nationality. However, based on 
existing data only 1 percent foreigners participated in China.) This leaves us with 2568 
participants who are nationals of the country of the experiment.  
In every country participants took part in a public goods game (with and without 
punishment; PG for short) prior to the die-in-a-cup task. To check for robustness, in 
several countries we additionally varied the experiment prior to our task and we also 
conducted stand-alone experiments (that is, the die-in-a-cup task without a prior 
experiment) as a test for potential spillovers from the PG. Based on a total of 721 
subjects, who participated in a different or no previous experiment, and a regression 
analysis we do not find an impact of the experiment preceding our die-in-a-cup task on 
reporting behaviour (see Section 2.5 for details).  
 
 
1.3 Further methodological details of the cross-societal implementation 
 
The implementation of our experiment closely followed the methodological 
standards introduced by Roth et al.43 and adapted to a multiple country setup by 
Herrmann et al.44. We aimed at only varying the societal background (i.e., country where 
the experiment was conducted) while minimising any variation from other sources. We 
took several steps to ensure this goal:  
• We selected societies that span a wide range of cultural and economic backgrounds, 
in particular indicators of the prevalence of rule violations that are most relevant to 
our study (Section 1.1 and Extended Data Table 1).  
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• We ran the experiment with undergraduate students. This minimises variability in the 
socio-demographic composition of the subject pools. Our participants share a similar 
age, level of education and upper middleclass background (Section 1.4). Young 
people have the further decisive advantage for our purposes that they will have had 
very limited possibilities of engaging in political fraud, in evading taxes, and in acts 
of corruption. The societal environment as we measure it (Section 1.1) is hence 
uninfluenced by our subjects.  
• Subject to local practices, we recruited participants according to a standardised 
procedure intended to obtain an approximately representative selection of local 
students who also did not know one another. In universities that host an experimental 
economics lab and use online recruiting systems we relied on local recruitment 
practices. In other universities we recruited participants by approaching students at 
random all around campus. We aimed to recruit students that did not have prior 
experience in economic experiments. Students who agreed to participate received a 
text message or an email to remind them of participation.  
• We aimed at getting at least 50 participants per subject pool. The average subject 
pool size is 112; the range is from 54 to 244 participants per subject pool (table S1).  
• We implemented a standardised protocol of how to conduct the experiment to 
minimise experimenter effects (see below). 
 
Instructions and protocol 
Subjects received instructions displayed on-screen in the local language. Instructions 
were originally written in English (see screen shots I-III) and, as is common practice in 
cross-cultural experiments, a native speaker translated the instructions into the relevant 
local language. A second native speaker provided a back translation45. Translations were 
fine-tuned until they converged.   
We conducted all sessions according to a standardised protocol. To further minimise 
experimenter effects, which may originate from subtle differences in the implementation 
of the protocol, we had one author (J.S.) present in the background in almost all sessions. 
He trained local research assistants and ensured consistent implementation of the 
protocol. Since subjects may react differently to a foreign experimenter, local native 
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speakers led the experiment and made announcements. J.S. carefully trained the local 
experimenters to minimise variation between subject pools. During the experiments J.S. 
stayed in the background and did not interact with the participants. Thus, participants 
were not aware of the international dimension of this research and participants most 
likely perceived it as a locally run experiment.   
 
Currency effects and stakes  
Simply converting earnings according to the nominal exchange rates would neglect 
differences in local purchasing power (PP) in the different subject pools. To minimise 
differences in stake sizes we collected information about the hourly wage of a typical 
student job as well as the costs of a lunch at the cafeteria of the university. Maximal 
earnings amounted to about ¼th of an hourly wage of a typical student job or about the 
price of half a lunch at a student cafeteria (recall that the experiment lasts only a few 
minutes). We adjusted stake sizes using those measures as they likely reflect local PP. 
Table S1 reports the nominal $-earnings of reporting the maximal claim. These vary from 
$0.7 dollar in Vietnam to $4.2 in the Netherlands. This reflects the fact that a dollar in Ho 
Chi Minh City has a considerably higher PP for a student than in the Netherlands. 
Even if small PP differences in the adjusted stake sizes remain they are unlikely to 
have an impact on our measures of dishonesty; the existing literature does not find stake 
size effects in laboratory experiments on dishonesty.41 Fischbacher and Heusi-Föllmi27 
did not find a significant difference when they tripled financial incentives in their die-in-
a-cup experiment. Similarly, Mazar et al.38 show that quadrupling the incentives had no 
significant impact on dishonesty in their matrix task. As further evidence, in one non-
western country (China) we conducted in addition to our normal incentives (n = 138) a 
low-stakes treatment (n = 99), where we divided standard incentives by 1/4. Average 
payments are 3.51 MU when subjects are faced with standard incentives and 3.59 MU 
with low incentives. A Rank sum test does not reveal significant differences in reported 
numbers (P = 0.8398). This is consistent with evidence that in simple tasks involving 
social preferences, stake size effects are absent46-48. Thus, within the range of tripling or 
quadrupling (small) monetary incentives stake sizes are unlikely to impact dishonesty.  
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Further evidence comes from regression analyses we report in Extended Data Table 
2 and Table S3 in Section 2.2. We included the variable ‘middleclass’, which reflects 
whether a participant reported its family’s income at the age of 16 to be below average 
(compared to other families in its country) or not. The variable ‘middleclass’ is not 
significantly related to participants’ reported claims. That is, even though the financial 
incentives to be dishonest are relatively bigger for poorer participants within a country, 
they are not significantly more likely to report higher numbers.  
 
1.4 Subject pool details 
 
Our subject pools consisted of samples of undergraduate students from local 
universities. We chose undergraduate students because we aimed for subjects who are 
homogenous across subject pools with respect to their socio-economic background. Large 
variability in the socio-demographic composition may introduce confounding factors 
with the subject pool differences we are interested in.   
Student samples have the advantage that participant pools are comparable: subjects 
are of similar age, typically from an upper or middleclass background and have a very 
similar level of prior education. They tend to be intelligent and used to problem solving. 
All of this qualifies them as a very useful subject pool if large random samples are not 
feasible and the main purpose is to test conceptual arguments49.  
Another important reason for using young subjects is that due to their youth they 
have had limited chances of influencing the honesty of their social environment, that is, 
the social environment (which we measure with PRV in 2003, when our subjects were 
between 11 and 14 years old – see Section 1.1) is arguably uninfluenced by our subjects.  
Although student subject pools are homogenous in many respects, some potential 
variation remains, which we measured with the help of a post-experimental 
questionnaire. Table S1 lists the countries, cities and universities the students were 
recruited from, the number of participants in each country, subjects' average nominal 
earnings in $, as well as the control variables we elicited. We use these variables as 
controls in the regression analyses (Extended Data Table 2; Tables S3, S4).  
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Austria Vienna University of Vienna 66 4.0 24.7 45 71 44 18 17 2 64 7.8 
China Shanghai Jiao Tong University 237 1.9* 22.1 35 60 10 0 12 5 82 9.5 
Colombia Bogota Universidad National 104 2.9 19.8 45 83 63 13 33 5 62 8.0 
Czech Rep. Prague University of Economics 77 2.6 22.9 57 87 73 62 21 2 40 7.5 
Georgia Tbilisi Tbilisi State University 97 1.8 19.1 57 77 49 0 78 15 30 8.7 
Germany Constance University of Constance HTWG Konstanz 69 4.0 21.4 55 87 52 10 32 4 65 7.6 
Guatemala Guatemala City 
Universidad Francisco 
Marroquin  
Universidad Rafael Landivar 
Universidad San Carlos de Guatemala 
Universidad Galileo 
Universidad del Valle de Guatemala 
193 3.3 22.0 42 95 50 7 66 9 43 8.8 
Indonesia Yogyakarta Gadja Mada University 76 1.1 20.7 64 87 38 41 92 10 43 9.3 
Italy Rome 
La Sapienza 
LUISS Guido Carli 
Tor Vergata 
82 3.5 26.6 55 89 77 18 38 1 38 8.3 
Kenya Nairobi Nairobi University 92 1.2 22.3 29 60 40 47 89 15 29 8.5 
Lithuania Vilnius Vilnius University 71 2.3 20.4 55 92 72 3 31 13 62 8.5 
Malaysia Semenyih University of Nottingham, Malaysian Campus 64 1.6 19.7 42 80 42 3 69 8 45 7.0 
Morocco Meknes Ecole Nationale d’Agriculture Meknès 138 1.8 20.9 65 88 48 1 87 50 34 8.5 
Netherlands Amsterdam  Groningen 
University of Amsterdam  
University of Groningen 84 4.2 21.8 49 93 62 30 21 3 80 7.3 
Poland Warsaw University of Warsaw 110 2.1 23.1 61 86 82 30 63 2 57 7.1 
Slovakia Bratislava 
Slovak Technical 
University  
Comenius University 
87 2.6 22.9 53 83 56 2 43 13 43 7.1 
South Africa Cape Town University of Cape Town 92 2.2 20.2 47 74 46 8 54 5 41 8.4 
Spain Granada University of Granada 54 3.3 22.6 44 88 50 52 41 7 - 8.4 
Sweden Linköping Linköping University 82 3.6 23.9 27 87 67 9 9 7 78 7.8 
Turkey Izmir Izmir University of Economics 244 2.8 21.9 47 87 82 5 44 21 43 7.8 
United 
Kingdom Nottingham University of Nottingham 197 4.1 19.3 49 79 48 13 33 1 58 8.2 
Tanzania Dar Es Salaam 
University of Dar Es 
Salaam 140 1.6 23.2 29 60 34 22 84 11 41 7.2 
Vietnam Ho Chi Minh City Economics University 112 0.7 20.0 64 88 25 60 27 10 65 7.2 
Mean   112 2.7 21.8 49 82 53 20 47 10 52 8.0 
Table S1 | Subject pool details, socio-demographics, beliefs in fairness of others, and personal norms 
of honesty. *In China, for a subset the maximal nominal earnings was $0.5.  
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Socio-demographics 
 
Age and % female are standard variables. The average participant was 21.7 (s.d. 3.3) 
years old and subject pools' average age ranged from 19.1 years to 26.6 years; 98% of 
subjects are younger than 30 years. The median age is 21 years. Across all subject pools, 
48% were female; the subject pool average range is from 27% to 65% females.  
 
% middleclass is based on participants’ personal judgment whether their family’s 
income at the age of 16 was ‘substantially below average’, ‘below average’, ‘average’, 
‘somewhat above average’, ‘above average’, or ‘far above average’. As a proxy for socio-
economic status the dummy variable ‘middleclass’ takes the value one if the subject 
answered at least 'average' and zero otherwise. Another reason to control for socio-
economic status is evidence (in US samples) suggesting that higher social class increases 
unethical behaviour50. Across all subject pools 81% of our subjects have a middle class 
background; the subject pool average range is from 60% to 95%. 
 
% urban. The dummy ‘urban’ is based on a question about the size of the city where 
participants had spent most of their lives. It takes the value of one if the city reported had 
at least 10'000 inhabitants and zero otherwise. This is intended to capture the degree of 
social anonymity subjects are typically used to. It is likely that social control is lower in 
large cities51 and this may matter for honesty. About half of our subjects (51%) grew up 
in a city with a size of 10'000 inhabitants or more; the subject pool average range is from 
10% to 82%. 
 
% economics students. We also control for the field of study of our subjects; in 
particular, we are interested in whether students of economics as a group behave any 
different from students of other fields52,53. We therefore elicited the field of study and 
create a dummy variable for economics. The variable % economics students shows that 
17% of our subjects were economists; the subject pool average range is from 0% to 62%. 
 
% religious. We also asked subjects how religious they are (on a 7-point scale, ranging 
from 1=not at all, to 7=very religious). We include this variable because there is evidence 
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that religiosity matters for honesty29,54,55 although there are good arguments why such a 
link is not straightforward and may not be robust.56-58 We classify a subject as religious if 
he or she answers at least at 4 and this gives us our variable % religious (in a subset of 
sessions in Morocco and Turkey participants could give a binary answer only). The 
average is 46% and the subject pool average range is from 12% to 92%. 
 
av. % known in a session. Through our recruitment we aimed at maximising anonymity 
across subjects. We controlled for the degree of anonymity we actually achieved by 
asking subjects at the end of the experiment how many other participants they had 
known. On average, subjects knew 11% of other participants; the typical average range is 
from 1% to 21%; in one very small university 50% knew at least one other participant.  
 
Beliefs in the fairness of others and individual norms of honesty 
In our analysis we not only control for the impact of socio-demographics for honesty 
in our experimental task but also include two variables that measure individual beliefs 
about the perceived fairness of others and individual norms of honesty.  
 
Belief in fairness of others. To capture subjects' belief in the fairness of others we asked 
the World Values Survey fairness question: “Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” The binary variable 
takes the value zero for the answer “People would try to take advantage of you” and one 
for the answer “People would try to be fair”. The subject pool average range in our 
sample is from 29% to 82% and the average is 52%.  
The variable ‘Belief in fairness of others’ is interesting because there is evidence that 
perceived unfairness increases dishonesty33. Moreover, arguably this question measures 
beliefs about the cooperativeness of other people59. In Extended Data Table 2 (column 3) 
we show that individual beliefs influence honesty in the sense that people who believe 
others are fair are less likely to report the income maximising number 5. While this is a 
correlation, recent research on the role of beliefs for social decision-making60,61 suggests 
that beliefs about the fairness of others can be causal for honesty. 
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Individual norm of honesty. This variable is based on our subjects’ response to three 
questions on whether a particular act of dishonesty can be justified or not. This question 
is interesting because there is evidence that "moral firmness", that is, stronger moral 
convictions, increases honesty29. The statements, which we took from the World Values 
Survey (WVS, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) are: (i) “Claiming government 
benefits to which you are not entitled”, (ii) “Avoiding a fare on public transport”, and (iii) 
“Cheating on taxes if you have a chance”. The subjects answered on a 10-point scale 
between “Never justifiable (=1) and “Always justifiable (=10). For each individual we 
took the average over the three questions and rescaled so that the value of 1 denotes low 
norms of honesty (always justifiable) and 10 high norms (never justifiable). The average 
in our sample is 8.1 with a subject pool average range from 7.0 to 9.5.  
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2. Supplementary Analyses 
 
2.1 Supplementary Analyses to Fig. 1 and Extended Data Fig. 2 
 
To compare actual data with the Full Honesty, Full Dishonesty and the Justified 
Dishonesty benchmarks, we used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for discrete data62, which 
accounts for the fact that our data are discrete, not continuous.  
When we pool the data from the subject pools from low PRV countries and high 
PRV countries, respectively, we get the following distribution of claims of 0 to 5, 
respectively, which we can compare statistically to the Justified Dishonesty benchmark 
(*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10, two-sided binomial tests): 
• Justified Dishonesty (0 to 5, resp): 2.8%, 8.3%, 13.9%, 19.4%, 25%, 30.6%.  
• Low PRV countries (1211 subjects; 14 countries):  
• In absolute numbers (0 to 5, resp): 120, 139, 127, 199, 287, 339.  
• In percent (0 to 5, resp): 9.9***, 11.5***, 10.5***, 16.4***, 23.7, 28.0**. 
• High PRV countries (1357 subjects; 9 countries):  
• In absolute numbers (0 to 5, resp): 77, 95, 145, 207, 381, 452. 
• In percent (0 to 5, resp):  5.7***, 7.0*, 10.7***, 15.3***, 28.1**, 33.3**. 
The low and high distributions are strongly and highly significantly different from 
one another (Chi2(5) = 40.21, P = 0.0000). These data are the basis for Extended Data 
Fig. 2b and the statistical analyses surrounding it in the main text. Here, we report two 
more complementary analyses supporting the claims made in the text about the difference 
between subject pools coming from low and high PRV countries. 
The first test concerns the difference in the distance from the Justified Dishonesty 
benchmark CDF for low and high PRV countries, respectively. As test statistic, we use 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s d (reported as KSD in Extended Data Fig. 2a). d is defined as the 
maximal absolute difference between the empirical CDF and a benchmark CDF63, in our 
case the CDF of Justified Dishonesty. For the test of differences we use the signed d, 
which is positive if the empirical CDF tends to lie above the benchmark CDF and 
negative otherwise (except for three subject pools (Shanghai, Meknes, Dar es Salaam), all 
d values are positive).  The average dlow = 0.1101 and dhigh = 0.0143 and the difference is 
significant (z = 2.772, P = 0.0056, two-sided rank sum test). We conclude that the CDFs 
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from low PRV countries tend to be above the Justified Dishonesty benchmark (and also 
above the CDFs from high PRV countries), whereas the CDFs from high PRV countries 
tend to be close to (or below of) the Justified Dishonesty benchmark CDF. Signed d is 
also significantly negatively correlated with PRV (Spearman’s ρ = -0.61, P = 0.0021).  
A second test concerns a difference in an index of concentration of the claims made 
by subjects from low and high PRV countries, respectively. As a summary statistic for 
each subject pool we calculate Simpson’s Index of concentration64, which is the sum of 
the squared frequencies of each of the possible six outcomes of the die roll. The Simpson 
Index Σ = 0.167 for the Full Honesty benchmark, where all six claims are equally likely; 
Σ = 0.221 for the Justified Dishonesty benchmark; and Σ = 1 for the Full Dishonesty 
benchmark. The more concentrated the claimed payments are on particular (typically 
high) claims the higher is Σ. For our subject pools, the average Σ is 0.222 and ranges 
from 0.180 to 0.317. Averages for subject pools from low and high PRV countries, resp., 
are Σlow = 0.206 and Σhigh = 0.248. The difference is significant according to a two-sided 
Mann-Whitney test (z = 3.276; P = 0.001). This provides further support for the 
observation of Fig. 1 and Extended Data Fig. 2b that claims are more equally distributed 
in low PRV countries (that is, closer to the Full Honesty benchmark) than in high PRV 
countries. Σ is significantly correlated with PRV (ρ = 0.65, P < 0.001). 
 
 
2.2 Supplementary regression analyses to Extended Data Table 2  
 (Societal and individual determinants of dishonesty) 
 
Extended Data Table 2 reports the regression results including the coefficients of the 
socio-economic controls. We chose these controls because they are standard or there is 
evidence that they matter for honesty. As robustness checks we run fixed effects 
regressions and find qualitatively very similar estimates for the variables varying within 
country. Hausman tests (without clustered errors) indicate that the coefficients are not 
significantly different between fixed and random effects specification for all three models 
with binary dependent variables. In case of ‘Claim’ as the dependent variable the 
Hausman test is significant. However, also in this model significant levels remain the 
same for all coefficients. We also conducted the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
to differentiate between random effects regression and pooled OLS. It does not reject the 
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hypothesis that the variance of the unobserved country effect is zero for the models in 
columns 1, 2, and 4, and only weakly rejects for the model of column 3.  
As a further robustness check we estimated non-linear models. Column 1 in Table S2 
reports ordered probit regressions, and Columns 2, 3 and 4 report marginal effects from 
probit regressions. The marginal effects are similar in magnitude to the OLS regressions 
reported in Extended Data Table 2; also all significance levels remain the same.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Claim High Claim Highest Claim No Claim 
  (Number 3, 4, or 5) (Number 5) (Number 6) 
PRV in 2003 0.070*** 0.029*** 0.012 -0.015*** 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) 
     
Individual norms of honesty -0.038*** -0.013*** -0.014** 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
     
Individual beliefs in fairness of others -0.070 -0.012 -0.050** -0.005 
 (0.054) (0.031) (0.021) (0.009) 
     
Age -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
     
Female -0.073* -0.020 -0.019 0.014 
 (0.039) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012) 
     
Middleclass -0.032 -0.022 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.065) (0.032) (0.023) (0.019) 
     
Urban -0.030 -0.027* -0.013 -0.006 
 (0.034) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) 
     
Economics 0.062 0.044 -0.008 -0.023 
 (0.069) (0.029) (0.032) (0.016) 
     
Religious -0.018 -0.029 0.023 0.016 
 (0.062) (0.023) (0.024) (0.014) 
     
% known in session 0.003 0.001 0.002** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 2284 2284 2284 2284 
pseudo R2 0.006 0.015 0.012 0.018 
Table S2 | Probit regression analysis of societal and individual determinants of dishonesty. Displayed 
are marginal effects of an ordered probit regression (column 1) and from probit regressions (columns 2, 3, 
4). Bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clusters on country level are in parentheses. Dependent 
variables are the claimed amount (between 0 and 5; column 1), and the binary variables whether a high 
claim was made (column 2); whether the highest claim (reporting 5) was made (column 3); or whether no 
claim (number 6) was made (column 4). The regressions use 2284 observations. Data from Spain is missing 
because due to a technical problem we do not have data on ‘belief in fairness´. In some Polish sessions 
(n=50) ‘Religious’ and ‘%-known’ is missing, and questionnaire data is missing for one Guatemalan and 
one Chinese session. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.  
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2.3 Robustness checks: association between intrinsic honesty and PRV, 
institutional quality, and cultural indicators 
 
Analysis by PRV sub-indicators 
The PRV sub-indicators ‘Control of Corruption’ and ‘Political Rights’ individually 
correlate with our experimental measure for dishonesty: mean claims are higher in 
countries with low control of corruption (Spearman’s ρ = -0.65, P = 0.0009; Table S3) 
and less political rights (ρ = -0.67, P = 0.0004). The correlation for ‘Shadow Economy’ 
(ρ = 0.34, P = 0.1102) has the expected sign but it is marginally insignificant.  
The regressions in Table S4 (columns 1, 2, 3) show that this finding is robust to the 
inclusion of socio-economic controls. The results are similar (to our findings in the main 
text) when we focus on the other experimental measures of intrinsic (dis)honesty. 
Spearman tests show that High Claims are significantly correlated with the PRV sub-
indicators Control of Corruption (P = 0.0002), Political Rights (P < 0.0001) and weakly 
with Shadow Economy (P = 0.0580); No Claim is significantly correlated with Control of 
Corruption (P = 0.0158) as well as Political Rights (P = 0.0220), while there is no 
correlation with Highest Claim. Regression results are available upon request. 
 
Stability of sub-indicators over time 
The sub-indicators change only slowly over time. The Spearman correlation between 
Control of Corruption in 1996 and 2012 is 0.85; for Shadow Economy between 1999 and 
2007 it is 0.99, and for Political Rights in 2003 and 2012 it is 0.94. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, correlations between our experimental measure of intrinsic 
honesty (conducted between 2011 and 2015) and the sub-indicators of PRV measured at 
different points in time do not vary much. For example, the Spearman correlation 
between Control of Corruption in 1996 and Claim in our experiment is -0.60  
(P = 0.0023). This is robust to regression estimates with socio-economic controls (see 
Table S3). In 1996 most of our participants were around 5 to 6 years old and therefore in 
no position to influence the measurement of corruption in their society. This underscores 
that subjects have been exposed to a rather stable environment with a particular level of 
PRV for a long period of time.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Claim High Claim Highest Claim No Claim 
  (Number 3, 4, or 5) (Number 5) (Number 6) 
Control of Corruption  -0.139*** -0.039*** -0.012 0.020*** 
in 1996 (0.038) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) 
     
Individual norms of honesty -0.055*** -0.013*** -0.014** 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) 
     
Individual beliefs in fairness -0.073 -0.011 -0.051** -0.004 
of others (0.086) (0.031) (0.021) (0.009) 
     
Constant 4.095*** 0.932*** 0.375*** -0.008 
 (0.315) (0.072) (0.111) (0.044) 
     
Socio-demographic controls Chi2(7)=13.14* Chi2(7)=16.41** Chi2(7)=7.28 Chi2(7)=10.08 
     
N 2284 2284 2284 2284 
R2 0.021 0.018 0.014 0.009 
Table S3 | Regression analysis using Control of Corruption in 1996 instead of PRV. Bootstrapped 
standard errors adjusted for clusters on country level are in parentheses. Dependent variables are the 
claimed amount (between 0 and 5; column 1), and the binary variables whether a high number was reported 
(column 2); whether the highest number was reported (column 3); or whether number 6 was reported 
(column 4). The regressions contain 2284 observations. Data from Spain are missing because due to a 
technical problem we do not have data on ‘belief in fairness´. In some Polish sessions (n = 50) ‘Religious’ 
and ‘%-known’ is missing, and questionnaire data is missing for one Guatemalan and one Chinese session. 
* P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Dishonesty and economic, institutional, and cultural indicators  
In the Extended Data Figs. 3 and 4 we demonstrate the association between 
institutional and cultural indicators and intrinsic honesty. Table S4 focuses on those 
associations in a regression analysis, when controlling for several socio-economic 
variables and individual norms of honesty and beliefs in fairness of others. Table S4 
shows that these associations are robust to the inclusion of those controls. Again 
individual norms of honesty are predictive of the claims. Socio-demographic variables 
are included in all regressions but are jointly significantly different from zero (at P < 0.1) 
only in model 2 (Chi2(7) = 18.9, P < 0.008), model 9 (Chi2(7) = 25.0, P < 0.001) and 
model 10 (Chi2(7) = 20.2, P = 0.005).  
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2.4 Supplementary regression analyses to Extended Data Table 3 
(Institutional and Cultural Determinants of PRV) 
 
The Extended Data Table 3 reports determinants of PRV. In this section we give a more 
detailed account on the estimation approach.  In an effort to shed light on causality we 
employ instrumental variables estimation following the economic literature that focuses 
on cultural and historic or ‘deep’ factors that influence economic prosperity and 
institutional quality. In line with the economic literature, our main focus is on two 
explanatory variables: individualism-collectivism and institutional quality.  
 
Individualism-collectivism and PRV. When estimating the effect of individualism (as a 
proxy for limited morality in collectivist societies, see Section 1.1 ‘Cultural Indicators’) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) (10) 
 Claim Claim Claim Claim Claim Claim Claim Claim Claim 
Control of corruption -0.161***         
in 2003 (0.039)         
          Shadow economy  0.006        
in 2003  (0.004)        
          Political rights   -0.013***       
in 2003   (0.004)       
          Constraint on Executive    -0.097***      
1990 to 2000    (0.029)      
          Gov. Effectiveness     -0.171***     
in 2000     (0.044)     
          GDP per capita      -0.022***    
(in $1000, 1990 to 2000)      (0.006)    
          Individualism       -0.006***   
       (0.002)   
          Traditional vs.         -0.100*  
secular-rational values        (0.053)  
          Survival vs.          -0.151*** 
self-expression values         (0.048) 
          Individual norms of honesty -0.057*** -0.046** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.043* -0.057*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018) 
          Individual belief in fairness  -0.074 -0.080 -0.120 -0.110 -0.079 -0.089 -0.096 -0.073 -0.086 
of others (0.085) (0.085) (0.081) (0.080) (0.086) (0.083) (0.088) (0.092) (0.088) 
          Constant 4.122*** 3.815*** 4.304*** 4.551*** 4.122*** 4.137*** 4.336*** 3.880*** 4.031*** 
 (0.301) (0.379) (0.329) (0.296) (0.314) (0.295) (0.297) (0.380) (0.327) 
Socio-Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2284 2284 2284 2284 2284 2284 2193 2192 2192 
R2 0.022 0.015 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.017 0.020 
Table S4 | Regression analysis of macro-level indicators and Claims. Dependent variable is claims (payout). Displayed are the coefficients from OLS 
regressions of macro-level indicators on claims with robust standard errors clustered on countries. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.  
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on PRV we have to take reverse causality or omitted variables into consideration (i.e., a 
high prevalence of rule violations strengthens family ties and collectivism since 
individuals cannot rely on the rule of law). We use two instruments for Individualism, 
grammatical rule, and genetic distance.  
Our first instrumental variable estimation strategy follows Licht et al.18 and 
Tabellini8 and uses grammatical rules concerning the use of pronouns as instruments for 
the cultural trait that is associated with limited morality (see Extended Data Table 3, 
column (8) and (10)). The underlying assumptions are that (i) there is a link between 
linguistic rules and deep features of culture and (ii) and the instrument is not correlated 
with the error term in the explanatory equation (conditional on other control variables). 
The data on linguistic rules are taken from Tabellini8 (data retrieved from 
http://didattica.unibocconi.it/mypage/index.php?IdUte=48805&idr=13301&lingua=ita). 
The variable is based on two grammatical rules. The first rule governs the use of first and 
second person pronouns in conversations. Languages like English make the use of subject 
pronouns obligatory (e.g., ‘I see’), while in other languages, like Spanish, the use is not 
obligatory (e.g., it is possible to say ‘veo’ or ‘yo veo’). Kashima and Kashima65 suggest 
that these rules reflect the conceptions of the person in different cultures. They argue that 
languages that forbid dropping the pronoun are typically those that emphasise the 
individual. The second grammatical rule concerns 2nd person differentiation. This 
differentiation exists in some languages (like in French the ‘tu’ and ‘vous’) and is 
associated with a hierarchy of power.  
As a second instrument for Individualism we follow Gorodnichenko and Roland19 
and use ‘genetic distance’ (Extended Data Table 2, columns (9) and (10)). Genetic 
distance is an indirect measure of cultural transmission. Parents transmit their genes to 
their children but also their culture. Genetic distance can therefore be seen as a proxy for 
very distant migration patterns and with it distant divergence in intergenerationally 
transmitted cultural traits. It is very unlikely that institutions influence genetic distance. 
We use the ‘genetic distance’ measure from Spolaore and Wacziarg66 (data retrieved 
from http://sites.tufts.edu/enricospolaore/). We take the genetic distance of each country 
to the USA, which is the most individualist country in our sample. The measure is based 
on neutral genetic markers, that is, markers that are not related to evolutionary fitness and 
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therefore should have no direct effect on behaviour and thus PRV. This identification 
strategy does not postulate a causal effect between genes and culture. It only exploits the 
correlation between cultural and genetic transmission. In column (10) of Extended Data 
Table 2 we use both ‘grammatical rules’ and ‘genetic distance’ as instrument for 
Individualism. This allows testing for overidentifying restrictions. 
 
Institutional Quality and PRV. The link between institutional quality and PRV is 
intuitive: strong formal institutions will limit rule violations. Empirical estimations, 
however, have to take account of reverse causality (a high prevalence of rule violation 
impairs the functioning of institutions) or omitted variables (e.g. deep cultural factors that 
lead to low quality formal institutions and a high prevalence of rule violations). Our 
instrumental variables estimation follows Acemoglu et al.67 using settler mortality as an 
instrument. The idea is that colonialisation strategies were different depending on settler 
mortality. In places with high settler mortality settlers installed extractive institutions 
(with low protection for private property) with the purpose of extracting and transferring 
resources of the colony to the coloniser. In places with low settler mortality settlers built 
inclusive institutions with a strong emphasis on private property and checks against 
government in power. These differences in institutions persisted after independence and 
are still reflected in current institutions. The exclusion restriction implied in this 
estimation strategy is that conditional on the other controls mortality rates have no effect 
on PRV today other than through their effect on institutions.  
Following Tabellini8, in all regressions of the Extended Data Table 3 we control for 
primary education in 1930 (Benavot and Riddle68) and legal origins (La Porta et al.69). As 
further controls we include GDP per capita, Government Effectiveness, and 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation in 1985 (due to Philip Roeder; downloaded from 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm; accessed 15.06.2015).  
Extended Data Table 3, columns (1-6), demonstrate that the coefficients for 
institutional quality (Constraint on Executive) as well as Individualism are significant and 
robust to the inclusion of other controls. Better institutions (as proxied by Constraint on 
Executive) and more individualist societies are associated with less PRV. Remarkably, 
the measure of past Constraint on Executive (average of 1890 to 1900) is also highly 
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significantly associated with current PRV (column 2). A potential transmission channel is 
culture, that is, “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and social 
groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (Guiso et al.70, p. 23). 
As such, distant events and/or (institutional) environments transmitted via culture can 
have lasting effects on societies.  Our further controls reveal that Primary Education in 
1930 (column 3), GDP (column 4), and Government Effectiveness (column 5) are 
negatively associated with PRV. We do not find an association with Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization and PRV.  
Our IV estimations in columns (7-10) suggest that the quality of institutions and 
individualism causally affect PRV. The coefficient for the quality of institutions 
(Constraint on Executive) is highly significant when using settler mortality as an 
instrument (column 7). When using the ‘grammatical rule’ as an instrument for 
Individualism the coefficient stays weakly significant (column 8), while it stays 
significant when using ‘genetic distance’ as an instrument (column 9), or using both 
simultaneously as instruments (column 10). The test for overidentifying restriction in 
column 10 suggests that the instruments for individualism were correctly excluded. 
 
Robustness checks. As robustness checks we replicated regressions by Acemoglu et al.67 
and Tabellini8 using the exact same indicators and controls as in their original work - the 
only differences being that we substituted our PRV measure as the dependent variable 
(they used GDP and bureaucratic quality, resp). Table S5 follows Acemoglu et al.67 and 
uses ‘protection against risk of expropriation’ as a proxy for the quality of institutions 
(data are taken from http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu/data/ajr2001). This proxy 
measures the risk of expropriation of private foreign investment by government, where a 
higher score means less risk of expropriation. It also controls for continents and latitude 
(distance to the equator normalized between 0 and 1). Controlling for latitude does not 
change the significant levels of ‘Average protection against expropriation’ both in the 
OLS regression and the instrumental variables estimation (columns 1 and 3). Adding 
continent dummies does not change the significance level in the OLS regression, while it 
reduces the significance level of ‘Average protection against expropriation’ in the IV 
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estimation though (column 2 and 4). Thus, overall the impact of the institutional variable 
‘Average protection against expropriation’ seems to be quite robust. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PRV PRV PRV PRV 
   IV: Settler Mortality IV: Settler Mortality 
Average protection against -0.57*** -0.48*** -0.97*** -0.79* 
expropriation 1985-1995 (0.09) (0.10) (0.30) (0.43) 
     
Latitude -2.79*** -2.07*** -1.14 -1.18 
 (0.80) (0.76) (1.39) (1.44) 
     
Africa dummy  0.48**  0.31 
  (0.23)  (0.27) 
     
Asia dummy  0.08  0.26 
  (0.26)  (0.32) 
     
“Other” continent dummy  -1.16***  -0.68 
  (0.25)  (0.69) 
     
Constant 4.53*** 3.66*** 6.86*** 5.53** 
 (0.50) (0.60) (1.84) (2.61) 
N 62 62 62 62 
R2 0.634 0.697 0.460 0.610 
1ststage F-stat   9.8*** 5.1*** 
Table S5 | Expropriation Risk and PRV following Acemoglu et al.67. Dependent variable is PRV in 
2003. The explanatory variables closely follow Acemoglu et al.67. The measure for institutions is ‘Average 
protection against expropriation 1985-1995’. In column (1) and (3) we control for latitude (normalised 
between 0 and 1) and column (2) and (3) contains continent dummies. In column (3) and (4) we 
instrumented Expropriation Risk (bold coefficients) with ‘Settler Morality’. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01. 
 
 
In Table S6 we replicate Tabellini’s approach8 for our PRV measure. Instead of 
‘Individualism’ we use his indicator ‘Trust & Respect’ as the measure for limited 
morality. The indicator ‘Trust & Respect’ is based on the two WVS question: (1) 
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful’ and (2) whether or not people answered that ‘tolerance and respect for 
other people’ is an important quality for children to learn at home. The other covariates 
are very similar to Extended Data Table 2. It is apparent from Table S6 that the 
alternative measure “Trust & Respect” is quite robust as a factor predicting PRV. Further, 
the other covariates behave very similarly compared to the Extended Data Table 3. 
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 (1) 
PRV 
(2) 
PRV 
(3) 
PRV 
(4) 
PRV 
(5) 
PRV 
   IV: Gram. Rule IV: Gram. Rule IV: Gram. Rule 
Trust & Respect -1.80*** -1.18*** -1.63* -1.33** -1.63*** 
 (0.33) (0.23) (0.87) (0.61) (0.59) 
      
Primary Education  -0.04*** -0.01* -0.03*** -0.01** -0.02*** 
in 1930 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Income in 1980-2000  -1.02***  -0.92***  
  (0.15)  (0.16)  
      
Constraint on Executive      -0.26*** 
1960-2000     (0.07) 
      
Constant 0.52* 8.53*** 0.40 7.74*** 1.27*** 
 (0.26) (1.17) (0.32) (1.23) (0.42) 
      
Control for UK and  
French Legal origins 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 63 63 50 50 50 
R2 0.716 0.827 0.749 0.851 0.801 
1st stage F-stat   14.1*** 10.7*** 11.2*** 
 
Table S6 | ‘Trust & Respect’ and PRV following Tabellini8. Dependent variable is PRV in 2003. The 
explanatory variables closely follow Tabellini8. Column (1) to (5) contain the variable Primary Education 
in 1930 and dummy variables for UK and French Legal origin. Column (2) and (4) contain a control for 
income between 1980-2000 and column (5) a control for institutions (Constraint on Executive 1960-2000). 
In column (3) to (5) we instrumented ‘Trust & Respect’ (bold coefficients) with grammatical rules on the 
use of pro-nouns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01. 
 
 
2.5 Testing for potential spillovers from preceding experiment 
Because our die-in-a-cup experiment is very short we attached it – like Fischbacher 
and Föllmi-Heusi27 whose procedures we follow closely - at the end of experimental 
sessions. In all subject pools the die-in-a-cup experiment was conducted after public 
goods experiments, which follow the procedures of Herrmann et al.71 (the only exception 
being Spain where the public goods game had a different parametrisation). First, subjects 
played a standard four-player linear public goods game for ten periods in a partner 
matching protocol followed by another ten periods of a four-player public goods game 
with punishment (composed of the same groups). We refer to these experiments as PG.  
Here we check whether there are spillovers from this first experiment on our die-in-
a-cup experiment. This is a possibility because of the findings of Peysakhovich and 
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Rand72 and in particular Houser, et al.33 who find spillovers from being a recipient in a 
dictator game on subsequent dishonest behaviour in a similar task to ours: subjects are 
more likely to cheat in reporting the outcome of a coin flip when they received only a 
very small or no amount from the dictator and they claimed to have been treated unfairly.  
Several aspects of our procedures likely mitigate the probability of spillovers:  
1. The two experiments are clearly separated. Like Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi27, our experiment is administered by telling subjects that they get 
additional money for filling in a questionnaire. Furthermore, while 
participants were told their total point earnings in each round of the PG, they 
did not receive feedback on their actual total earnings from the whole PG 
before the die-in-a-cup experiment (and never received feedback about 
earnings in their local currency before the die-in-a-cup experiment).  
2. Compared to the one-shot dictator game in Houser, et al.33, our repeated PG 
with and without punishment is more complex. One important difference is 
that participants are in a symmetric situation taking repeated choices. Thus, 
they are not the sole receivers at the discretion of others - payoffs partly 
depend on their own choices and they can react to the behaviour of others. In 
case of the standard PG (without punishment) they can adjust their 
contribution in all but the last round, while in the PG with punishment they 
can also punish others. Being able to take matters in their own hands by 
choosing contribution levels and retaliation likely reduces the need to 
compensate (due to a feeling of unfairness) in the die-rolling experiment.  
 
Even though our procedures and design make spillovers unlikely, in this section we 
are testing for them. We follow two approaches: (i) exogenous variation of preceding 
experiments: in several countries we tested whether stand-alone or different previous 
experiments lead to systematically different reporting behaviour; (ii) regression 
approach: we tested whether individuals’ experience in the PG is predictive of 
subsequent behaviour in the experiment on intrinsic honesty. 
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Exogenous variation of preceding experiments  
The countries where we varied the preceding experiments are Austria (a risk task;  
n = 21); China (social learning; n = 118); Guatemala (stand alone; n = 94); Morocco 
(other social preferences; n = 79); Poland (other social preferences; n = 50); Sweden 
(stand-alone, n = 26), Turkey (stand-alone, n = 83; and other social preferences, n = 95) 
and United Kingdom (other social preferences I, n = 75; other social preferences II,  
n = 26; and stand-alone, n = 58). These countries cover a wide variation regarding 
average payment reported (UK second lowest, Morocco second highest).   
The cleanest test for spillovers is to see whether behaviour without exposure to a 
previous experiment is different from behaviour after having experienced the PG. In four 
countries (Guatemala, Sweden, Turkey and UK) we conducted stand-alone experiments. 
The rank sum test in each country does not reject the hypothesis that the two samples 
(stand-alone vs after PG) have the same distribution. The P-value is 0.8841 in the United 
Kingdom, 0.4158 in Turkey, 0.2229 in Sweden and 0.2396 in Guatemala. The Fisher 
exact test also does not reject the hypothesis that they are from the same distribution (UK: 
P = 0.3010; Turkey: P = 0.1820; Sweden: P = 0.500; Guatemala: P = 0.7770).  
Likewise we do not find significant differences when applying the rank sum test in 
the case of Austria (P = 0.3903); Morocco (P = 0.2949); and Poland (P = 0.6562). The 
same is the case for the Fisher exact test (Austria: P = 0.346; Morocco: P = 0.2820; 
Poland: P = 0.455). For China, even though the means are similar (3.66 MU after PG vs. 
3.43 MU after Social Learning), the rank sum test is weakly significant (P = 0.0798). 
Lastly, we apply a Kruskal-Wallis test in the case of United Kingdom, where we 
have four conditions and Turkey, where we have three conditions. In the case of Turkey 
the Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the hypothesis that the data is drawn from the 
same distribution (P = 0.2614), while in the United Kingdom P = 0.0976. Overall these 
findings show that spillovers are unlikely.  
 
Regression Analysis 
To shed further light on potential spillovers we conduct a regression analysis. This 
allows us to check whether our main result, namely that PRV is predictive of intrinsic 
honesty, holds when we control for several variables that captures a person’s experience 
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in the previous PG. The results are reported in Table S7, columns (1)-(3). It is apparent 
that the PRV is a highly significant predictor for reported payments even after controlling 
for previous experiences in the PG.  
Having established that our main results holds when controlling for previous 
experience, in what follows we explain our regression approach in more detail and 
discuss how and if we expect to see correlations between experience in the PG and 
intrinsic honesty. Correlations between the two experiments can be either due to (i) 
experiences made in the previous experiment (spillovers) or (ii) underlying individual 
traits or (firm) beliefs unaffected by the experience in the PG. Two considerations mark 
the starting point for our analysis.  
 
(i) Spillovers: Following Houser et al.33, one may expect potential spillovers to likely 
manifest themselves as follows: Participants, who contributed more to the PG than 
their members may feel treated unfairly by others’ free riding. Thus the hypothesis is 
that – if there are spillovers – we expect individuals with higher relative 
contributions (conditional on others' average contributions) to lie more. Another 
potential source of feeling treated unfairly may work through received punishment – 
which we control in our regression as well. 
For several reasons the last period is particularly interesting: Except for the last 
period(s) contributions in the repeated PG game may be driven by strategic 
reputational concerns. Thus, cooperative subjects may experience a higher fraction of 
low contributions in the last period. Further, the very last period is also the period 
where participants have no option to retaliate (e.g., cannot decrease contribution or, 
in the PG with punishment, cannot counter-punish in the next period). Lastly, 
compared to the early periods the last period in the PG with punishment may be 
more salient in memory. One can therefore expect spillovers to be more important in 
the last period compared to earlier periods.  
(ii) Underlying traits: The first decision individuals take is unaffected by any previous 
experimental experiences. As such it constitutes a measure for cooperative attitudes. 
Finding a positive correlation between lying and cooperative choices in the very first 
period suggests that this correlation is driven by more fundamental underlying 
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preferences. For example, there may be a ‘moral’ type, who has strong preference for 
cooperation and honesty. Thus, in contrast to spillovers (where we expect a negative 
correlation) underlying traits predict a positive correlation between contributions in 
the PG and honesty. This is especially the case for the very first period. 
Nevertheless, initial choices may lead to systematically different experiences 
during the course of the experiment. In our regressions we control for several factors 
participants experience during the course of the PG. This and the fact that the first 
period is the farthest past in memory, makes it unlikely that the coefficient of the first 
period contributions capture experiences in the PG. 
 
Table S7 reports the results of ordered probit regressions with Claim as the 
dependent variable. Our starting point is individual (average per period) earnings in the 
PG (column 1 controlling for PRV and column 4). Even though this is only a coarse 
measure for experience in the PG it allows us to see whether there are income effects. 
There is a weakly significant effect of income in the PG on dishonesty when controlling 
for a country’s PRV (column 1), while we find no effect without the PRV control 
(column 2). This effect is positive – contrary what is predicted if subjects would use the 
die-rolling-experiment to compensate for low earnings in the PG. 
To get more detailed insights we include several variables capturing behaviour and 
experiences in the PG. (The first part refers to variables capturing experiences in the PG 
without punishment while the second part to those in the PG with punishment.) To 
describe the PG without punishment (first part) we include subjects’ very first decisions 
(‘Contribution Period 1’). We also control for the three other group members’ average 
contributions in period 1 of the PG without punishment (‘Others Av. Contr. Period 1’). 
Further controls for the standard PG are the individual’s average contributions in periods 
2 to 10 (‘Av. Contribution in Period 2 to 10’) and the three group members' average 
contributions in these periods (‘Others Av. Contr. in Period 2 to 10’). Similarly, in the PG 
with punishment we control for the individual’s average contributions (‘Average Contr. 
(other Periods)’) and the average contributions of the group members (‘Others Av. Contr. 
(other Periods)’). In columns 2 and 5 ‘Others Av. Contr. (other Periods)’ is the average 
contributions over all periods, while for column 3 and 6 it is the average of periods 1 to 9. 
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Additionally, we also control for the average amount of pro-social punishment (‘Av. 
Received Pro-Pun (other periods)’) and anti-social punishment (‘Av. Received anti-Pun 
(other periods)’) received.  
It is apparent from table S7 that none of the variables capturing experiences and 
behaviour in the PG are significant when controlling for countries PRV (column 2 and 3). 
For example, others' behaviour in the first period of the standard PG does not have a 
significant impact on the number reported in the die-in-a-cup experiment. Neither do 
average contributions (in both the standard PG and the one with punishment) as well as 
pro- or antisocial punishment received. In column 3 we estimate a model where we 
additionally include variables that capture behaviour and experiences in the last period of 
the PG with punishment. The last period in the PG with punishment is the freshest in 
memory; strategic, reputational incentives are absent; and subjects cannot react to 
behaviour of others in future periods. As is apparent from column 3 these additional 
variables are not significant predictors of Claim. This is evidence that spillovers are not 
very likely.  
In columns (5) and (6) we do not control for country effects. Interestingly, the 
coefficients for others average contributions in the PG without punishment (‘Others Av. 
Contr. in Period 2-10’) are significantly positively related to Claim. Thus, those who 
experienced high contributions of their other group members are more likely to make a 
higher Claim. This is in contrast to what spillovers due to fairness concerns (or 
cooperative norms revealed by others high contributions) predict.   
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 (1) 
Claim 
(2) 
Claim 
(3) 
Claim 
(4) 
Claim 
(5) 
Claim 
(6) 
Claim 
PRV in 2003 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.072***    
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)    
       
Average Profit 0.008*   -0.002   
 (0.004)   (0.006)   
PG without punishment       
  Contribution Period 1  -0.007 -0.007  -0.008 -0.009 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
       
  Av. Contribution in Period 2-10  -0.005 -0.005  -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
       
  Others Av. Contr. Period 1  0.003 0.002  -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
       
  Others Av. Contr. in Period 2-10  0.006 0.006  0.013** 0.012* 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007) 
PG with Punishment        
  Average Contr. (other Periods)  -0.006 -0.002  -0.009 -0.005 
  (0.009) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.012) 
       
  Contribution Period 10   -0.005   -0.005 
   (0.006)   (0.006) 
       
  Others Av. Contr. (other Periods)  0.009 0.011  0.001 0.002 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.010) 
       
  Others Av. Contr. Period 10    -0.001   0.001 
   (0.008)   (0.008) 
       
  Av. Received pro-pun, (other   -0.004 0.001  -0.001 0.003 
  periods)  (0.020) (0.023)  (0.020) (0.024) 
       
  Received Pro-Pun., Period 10   -0.007   -0.007 
   (0.012)   (0.011) 
       
  Av. Received Anti-Pun, (other   -0.006 -0.005  0.004 0.004 
  periods)  (0.028) (0.033)  (0.032) (0.037) 
       
  Received Anti-Pun., Period 10   0.000   0.001 
   (0.014)   (0.014) 
N 1741 1741 1741 1741 1741 1741 
Wald  Chi2 11.42*** 42.7*** 101.72*** 0.10 22.59*** 59.81*** 
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.0000 0.002 0.002 
 
Table S7 | Relation of experience in PG and behaviour in the die-in-a-cup experiment. Dependent 
variable is Claim in the die-rolling experiment. Data from Spain is missing because the parametrization of 
the PG was different. Bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for 22 clusters in countries are reported in 
parentheses (* P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01). 
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